The indicated treatment for ethylene glycol poisoning is renal dialysis, which in this instance would almost certainly have saved the woman's life. But she refused to consent to treatment. Arriving at the emergency room, she presented a hand-written
2 note in which she explained that she had drunk antifreeze in an attempt to end her life, and that she had come to hospital not to be saved, but in order that she might die comfortably, and not alone at home. Over the following hours she repeatedly refused all life-saving treatment. She died in the early hours of the morning of 19 September. The woman's name was Kerrie Wooltorton. Her case came to public attention upon the publication of the Norfolk County Coroner's report, and has been a subject of controversy ever since. Much of the dispute has centred on the question of what the law dictates for a case of this sort, and in particular which legal framework is appropriate for navigating this tragic circumstance. Some have argued that the Wooltorton case should be approached by way of the Mental Health Act of 1983. The MHA establishes the power to 'section' mentally disordered individuals who are a danger to themselves or to others and to treat them involuntarily. Kerrie Wooltorton had been diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, and had long history of selfharming behaviour; it is plain that she was a danger to herself. Accordingly, some have argued that she ought to have been sectioned and given life-saving treatment without her consent.
Others, including the Norfolk County Coroner, have taken a different view.
They have viewed the Wooltorton case through the lens of the Mental Capacity Act (2005) . The Mental Capacity Act is a new piece of legislation, rooted in a series of landmark court rulings in the 1990s. These court rulings, together with the statute that followed in their wake, are meant to ensure that competent adult patients have a right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. In one much-cited 1997 case, Justice ButlerSloss ruled that an adult has "the absolute right to refuse medical treatment, for any reason, rational or irrational, or for no reason at all" (Re MB [1997] EWCA Civ 3093). Butler-Sloss's formulation was itself adapted from a 1992 case in which Lord Donaldson wrote that "[the patient's right of choice] exists notwithstanding that the reasons for making that choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent" (Re T [1993] Fam. 95). But these rights are in one crucial respect conditional: an adult has the right to refuse treatment if she has the mental capacity to do so. Where capacity is lacking the rights of the patient must give way to forms of surrogate decision-making and duties of best-interest care.
The MCA defines the threshold concept of mental capacity as follows. A person has the capacity to make a decision for herself if she is able to 'understand and retain' the information relevant to the decision, is able to 'use or weigh' that 3 information in reaching a decision, and is able to 'communicate a choice.' The Norfolk County Coroner and the medical personnel on hand at the hospital were unanimously in agreement that Kerrie Wooltorton satisfied this standard: she understood the diagnosis of ethylene glycol poisoning and the purpose of the proposed dialysis; she was able to 'use and weigh' that information in reaching a decision; she emphatically communicated her choice. Accordingly, they argued, she had a right to refuse treatment, even at the cost of her life. Moreover, to treat her without her consent would have amounted to a form of assault. antinomies that yield contradictory obligations. Formally, the antinomies that concern me consist of a pair of sound arguments that together entail a conjunction of the form "S is obliged to phi and S is obliged to not-phi," where S is a person and phi is the name of a particular action. The Wooltorton case threatens to yield such an antinomy, where phi is the action of performing (or authorising) renal dialysis, and S is the responsible medical officer on duty at the time of Wooltorton's hospital
admission.
In what follows I shall argue that current mental health legislation in England and Wales exhibits systematic antinomial tensions. I show that these antinomial structures are not a quirk or defect of the legislation but are intrinsic to the reality that these laws seek to regulate. Throughout my aim will be to draw on the resources of the post-Kantian idealist tradition in trying to understand these antinomies and in 2 KrV A407/B434. Wooltorton suffered from a mental disorder of a nature or degree that warranted hospital treatment, and she was a danger to herself.
The claim that Wooltorton lacked capacity is much harder to gauge: a capacity assessment can require considerable professional skill, and that skill must be exercised in a face-to-face encounter with the patient who is being assessed. There are difficulties surrounding such assessments, to be sure, but it is striking that all those who encountered Wooltorton at the hospital were in agreement -and no one seems to have been in doubt -about her capacity when measured against the legal standard. Here it is crucial to note that the law explicitly recognises that a person may suffer from a mental disorder and nonetheless be possessed of mental capacity. 6 One of the fundamental principles of the MCA approach is that capacity must be assessed with specific reference to the functional abilities of the individual in the face of the relevant decision; one cannot refute the legal presumption of capacity simply on the basis of a generic psychiatric diagnosis. What, finally, about the general claim as to the 'trumping' precedence of the MHA? The legal issues here are complex, and for present purposes it is best not to get drawn too far into them. Suffice to say that the 4 Both these arguments were advanced by a pair of forensic psychiatrists commenting on the case in a letter to the BMJ: Bashir and Crawford (2009) will come into conflict. Cases will arise in which a concern for public health points in one direction and the respect for autonomy points in another.
But there is a deeper source of the antinomial structures in this area of the law, and this pertains not so much to the values of the two statutory frameworks, but rather to the standpoint or perspective that each statute adopts toward the patient. Or to put the point more exactly: the two legal frameworks each dictate a perspective that the carer must take up toward the potential care-recipient. Taken together these two standpoints themselves generate antinomial tension. This is a point that requires elaboration.
Consider the circumstance of a psychiatric care-provider who is faced with the decision about whether to 'section' a patient in order to provide involuntary care.
Suppose that it is established that the individual suffers from a serious mental disorder 8 See Szmukler et al. (2010 "under the idea of freedom," then we treat her refusal as the manifestation of her free, self-determining choice. But when we view her instead through the prism of the MHA -"under the idea of probabilistic risk assessment," as it were -that same refusal shows up as simply one more symptom (effect) of Wooltorton's disorder 9 Strawson (1962) . decision not to continue taking contraception is not the product of her free will" (para.
73).
9 (cause). Given the right sort of ancillary knowledge, we can extrapolate ahead to the further disastrous consequences to come. So which perspective should we adopt toward Wooltorton? Is she a suffering creature in the grip of a disorder that can be managed? Or is she a moral agent whose choices must be respected? The answer, of course, is both. It would be a fateful error to suppose that we can choose between these two perspectives. They both apply, and indeed the clinician is legally bound to take up both of them. The antinomial pressures that we find in the law reflect the antinomial pressures that result from the combination of these two perspectives.
If this much is correct then a second Kantian coping strategy suggests itself.
We are not here in the domain of the mathematical antinomies, where the resolution lies in exposing a fallacy. We are rather in the domain of Kant's third antinomy, where the challenge is to accommodate two sound arguments, and to find room for both free agency and causal determination. Kant's own strategy for managing this challenge famously involves a form of dualism: both perspectives are legitimate, indeed requisite; the key is to confine each to its appropriate domain. One version of this dualism notoriously turns on the Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena: considered as appearances our actions are determined; considered as noumena we are free. But we might also cast the dualism -this seems to have been a crucial part of Strawson's suggestion -as a dualism of theoretical and practical attitudes. Viewed from the theoretical standpoint, the patient's behaviour can be explained and (fallibly) predicted as so much causal output of a complex biological machine in a complex environment. Viewed practically we treat the patient's behaviour as the manifestation of autonomous agency. Freedom prevails from the latter standpoint; determinism (or probabilistic causation) from the former. As long as we do not mix or confuse the standpoints the two descriptions of the patient need not contradict one another.
But these celebrated Kantian dualisms cannot help us with Kerrie's Antinomy.
The problem is not that they introduce some rather heavy metaphysical baggage; set that concern aside for the moment. The more fundamental problem is that the clinical situation itself requires the clinician to adopt both these perspectives in the same This is where we come to the extravagant thought. Suppose it were the case that the not-I which determines the I were itself determined by the I. Imagine, if you will, that you are a kind of God: you have made the not-I exactly as you decided it should be, and you now allow yourself to be determined by the not-I you have made.
There is, undoubtedly, something disturbingly solipsistic about such a thought.
Nonetheless there would be, in such a circumstance, a certain kind of formal reconciliation of thesis and antithesis, determination-by-self and determination-byother. For under such an extraordinary circumstance the I would indeed be determined by the not-I. We thus satisfy the requirements of determinism. But this deterministic moment would not itself compromise the freedom of the I, since the not-I that determines the I would itself be determined by the I. The circle is closed.
A Fichtean approach to the antinomy of freedom and determinism seeks to exploit this extravagant thought. It involves, first, a recognition of the permanent tension between thesis and antithesis. We finite beings will never find ourselves in the circumstances of the solitary god whom we have just described. But the Fichtean 11 strategy for addressing that tension is ultimately not metaphysical but practical; it is a form of striving. The finite Fichtean subject works on the not-I, ever seeking to determine the world in accordance with its judgement as to how it ought to be. By remaking the world in this way, the gap between thesis and antithesis progressively closes: the I comes closer and closer to the point where self-determination and determination-by-other coincide. Her medical condition was stabilised, but she did not regain consciousness. She was kept alive by life-supporting medical equipment which provided artificial nutrition and hydration. For the first few days in hospital her breathing was supported by an artificial ventilator; subsequently a tracheostomy was performed, and she regained the ability to breathe on her own. Polly was unconscious for several months but then emerged into what is medically described as a 'minimally conscious state.'
Prior to her accident, Polly had been a fiercely independent woman. She led an adventurous life, travelling the world; her favourite pastimes included sailing and mountain-climbing. Her family describe her as someone who celebrated her physical strength and valued her independence. In cartoons and poems she described herself as a free spirit, someone who hated to be tied down or to be dependent on others; she wanted to be able to 'fend for herself.' In one of her notebooks she recorded that she 12 imagines dying young, doing something exciting, that she does not want to be less able, or to know that she is slowly going downhill. 'Life is not measured by the number of breaths we take, but by the moments that take our breath away.' Polly was also politically active, and (among other things) a persistent critic of medical paternalism, heroic medical measures, and the like. She even wrote a how-to pamphlet about advance decision-making, although she never completed a formal advance-decision document herself. Polly's family and friends agree that, given a choice, the Polly they knew would have preferred to die rather than survive in such a way as to be wholly dependent on carers, family and the medical establishment.
Early on in the course of her care, members of Polly's family began to raise the question as to whether Polly would have wanted the sorts of life-preserving measures that were being provided to her. Would she have wanted to go through the ordeal of treatment and rehabilitation to achieve whatever degree of 'recovery' might be has the capacity to provide it. In consultation with his surgeon, John exhibits understanding of the diagnosis and the purpose of the treatment, and agrees to proceed with surgery. Back at the psychiatric ward, he discusses the situation with his care team and case worker. Plans are made for the surgery. But a few days later John's delusional symptoms return. He is now convinced that the proposed medical procedure is a conspiracy, and that the surgeon's speciality (commonly abbreviated as 'ENT") is not "Ears, Nose and Throat," but "Electroneurotherapy," a fictional treatment that will kill him. He refuses to go ahead with the surgery.
By now we can recognise the tendency toward antinomy in such a circumstance. The care team's aim is to care for John, yet they are also committed to honouring John's rights as a patient. Should they treat John involuntarily in his own best interests? Should they desist in the face of his refusal? They know that in such circumstances the law requires a capacity assessment, but the outcome of such an assessment varies dramatically depending on the time they choose to conduct it.
John's capacity fluctuates with his disorder, and perhaps also with his medication In analysing John's case, it is instructive to begin from his own retrospective assessment. It might be tempting to conclude that John's report is simply mistaken.
From what we know of the case, it seems plain that John did not in fact make the decision on his own; a veritable army of Others helped him make it, and those Others played a significant role in determining what that decision turned out to be. Some of that determination came in the form of presenting him with information. But it also involved framing that information in ways designed to shaped John's response to it;
and it involved some quite direct manipulation of the neurochemistry of John's brain.
In the sparse language of our dialectic: John was determined by the not-I.
So was John's retrospective report simply an error, perhaps even a delusion? Such a conclusion would be far too hasty. For one thing, John is well aware that
Others played a significant role in enabling his decision. He is not denying their role in claiming the decision as his own. Yet despite the decisive role of others, John experiences his decision as own; he recognises it as his own, and it in turn is recognised as his decision. For in taking John's consent as valid, John's care team are recognising John's ownership of the decision. So John's decision is determined by the other, yet it is also recognised as one that he made for himself. This is not an antinomy, but it is the sort of contradiction that the idealists claimed to find in Geist, and through which Geist is said to be able to endure. The final point to make about John's situation concerns not John himself, but the carers who played a role in John's world. The many practitioners of the vocations of care who came into contact with John at the material time of his decision encountered him with an orientation, we might even say an impulse, a habit (hexis) of beneficence. In their capacity as doctors, psychiatrists, social workers, even prison officers, an intrinsic aim of their vocation is to help John, to care for him, to act in such a way as to advance John's own interests. But this habit of beneficence does not hold sway unchecked. It is balanced and opposed by a duty, and presumably also a desire, to respect John's autonomy, his right of self-determination. That itself, we must hope, has become a habit of care. In many circumstances of care, including
If this is right -if
John's, these two impulses, habits, reasons, motives … pull in opposite directions. It is then all too easy to think of the tension between these two principles finitely, as a zero-sum game. Where the choice is vexed one looks to the law for guidance. Which 22 statute applies here? Which principle trumps the other? But in the logic of John's situation we find a possibility of holding the ensuing contradictions in such a way as to preserve both of these commitments. §7 Applications
What remains is to consider whether and how this Hegelian schema might help us understand and navigate the antinomies from which we began. Before tackling this question directly, we must be careful to calibrate our expectations. No philosophical analysis or theoretical framework will make cases like those of Kerrie and Polly easy or happy; these are tragic hard cases in which any decision will be fraught and any outcome tinged with regrets. Moreover, it would be a mistake to expect any philosophical investigation of these questions of itself to provide 'answers'
to questions that must in the end by decisively influenced by subtle factors that can only be gathered 'on the ground' in the clinical encounter, and by empirical considerations about the populations to which Kerrie and Polly belong. The most we should expect of a philosophical analysis is that it might provide a framework within which such particular considerations can be taken into account.
But aside from these familiar general warnings, there is a further consideration that applies here. The main point that I have been trying to press is that antinomies like those of Kerrie and Polly are intrinsic to our current situation. No technical fix to the legislation --e.g., a better definition of "best interest" or an improved test for capacity --will make them go away. Indeed we can hypothesise that versions of Kerrie's and Polly's antinomies will arise in any jurisdiction which applies broadly liberal legal commitments in regulating the vocations of care. Accordingly, the last thing we should expect of our abstract Hegelian analysis is that it will show us that one side in the antinomial tension is the 'right' one to endorse against the other. If the Hegelian analysis can nonetheless help orient our approach to the antinomies, it must be at a different level altogether, by providing a perspective from which we can acknowledge both thesis and antithesis, and by providing an orientation that can be put to work in navigating fields of practice that are ineliminably characterised by antinomial tension. Those who find themselves tasked with this decision now undertake to learn about Polly's values and preferences, and to consult with her family and friends. Suppose they now explicitly set out to so constitute their Otherhood in such a way that Polly herself could recognise it as her fitting Other, and will so recognise it retrospectively if indeed she emerges from her ordeal. Under such circumstances, I submit, Polly retains a significant form of autonomy even in her coma.
Here I must pause to consider a legal objection. It is common among jurists to distinguish between two opposed frameworks for best-interest decision-making.
According to what is known as the "substituted standard," a best interest decision is in effect an attempt to model the decision that the patient herself would have taken if she had been possessed of capacity at the material time when a decision has to be made. This is contrasted to an "objective" construal of the best interest standard, which allows that patients are sometimes in error as to their own best interest. Councils that provide funds for workshops to reflect about the dilemmas that ensue.
The task Hegel sets himself in the Philosophy of Right is to describe a whole society that satisfies the Eve Standard.
I shall not here try to describe Hegel's solution to this large-scale problem.
But it does seem to me that for us, one element of the solution might be for such a society to adopt a range of overlapping and partly competing statutory arrangements that are applicable to a case like Kerrie's, and are available to care-workers to deploy in the exercise of their vocation. If Kerrie finds herself in such a society, and if her local decision community is constituted in a way that a choice among those statutory provisions is undertaken in a way that is itself guided by the Eve Standard, then Kerrie's Antinomy can be navigated -not in a way that avoids tragedy, but in way that satisfies both of the impulses and duties from which it ultimately arose. 
